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
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**AFTER WAR AND REVOLUTION:
TRENDS IN RUSSIAN MIDDLE
EASTERN POLICY**

Stephen J. Blank
Wilbur E. Gray



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FOREWORD

The collapse of the former Soviet Union has brought a plethora of changes to world politics. One of these changes, and certainly not the least in importance, is the hope of genuine stability in the Middle East. With the present Russian regime both unable and unwilling to compete with the United States in the region, once irreconcilable neighbors must sit down and talk peace. Doing otherwise will no longer bring a guarantee of support from either the White House or the Kremlin. Cooperation between the world's two greatest antagonists has forced the issue.

But as the authors point out in this monograph, the road to a more stable Middle East faces many obstacles. Russian cooperation with the United States exists, after all, because it fits Moscow's needs at the moment. A resurgent Iran, concern over Russia's southern strategic flank, the Arab-Israeli peace process and ethnic tensions are all Middle Eastern problems that Russian President Boris Yeltsin must deal with simultaneously. In doing so it is quite probable that, in the future, Washington and Moscow might find themselves as antagonists once more. The possibility also remains, given Yeltsin's precarious political position, that another August coup could occur, and this time succeed.

The authors examine these many issues, describing the evolution of current Russian policy towards the Middle East, and how it is likely to shift in the future. While there are some reasons for optimism, Russia's regional role will be shaped by extraordinarily complex factors that bear careful watching by U.S. policymakers.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this monograph as a contribution to the larger issue of alternative Russian futures.



GARY L. GUERTNER
Acting Director
Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

STEPHEN J. BLANK has been an Associate Professor of Russian/Soviet Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute since 1989. Prior to this appointment Dr. Blank was Associate Professor for Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education of Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base. Dr. Blank's M.A. and Ph.D. are in Russian history from the University of Chicago. He has published numerous articles on Soviet military and foreign policies, notably in the Third World, and is the author of a forthcoming study of the Soviet Commissariat of Nationalities and editor of books on Soviet foreign policies in Latin America and on the future of the Soviet military.

MAJOR WILBUR E. GRAY is a Virginia National Guardsman serving with the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, as a Strategic Research Analyst. A graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Major Gray holds bachelor's degrees in history and political science from Clemson University and a master's degree in international relations from the University of Southern California. A military intelligence officer in the Active/Guard Reserve program, he has had numerous active duty assignments, to include a tour with the 1st Armored Division in Germany. He has also served with the 29th Infantry Division(L), VA ARNG. His most recent assignment was as Associate Professor of Military Science, University of Virginia.

SUMMARY

The dramatic changes in international affairs have brought the hope of stability for the volatile Middle East closer to realization than ever before. That this has happened is due primarily to a new spirit of cooperation in the area between the United States and Russia. Without competition between the two world powers, none of the region's disputants has the opportunity to ignore gestures of peace with a guarantee of support from Washington or Moscow. This era of "New Thinking" on the part of the Russians seems well on course, but it is not irreversible. Even now, Russia's relatively free press reports growing dissent over current Middle Eastern policy. Should Russian President Boris Yeltsin's free market gamble fail, a change in administrations is possible, and with it a change in Middle Eastern strategy as well.

Russia's interest in the area, however, is anything but new. Since the age of the Czars, Russia has always been concerned about its southern geographic and strategic flank, the "soft underbelly of the empire." That this region was also the heart of militant and expansionist Islam only added to the Kremlin's worries. Thus Russia has had a history of involvement in the Middle East, with Ottoman Turkey first perceived as a regional threat, then as a target *vis-a-vis* Russian security. This policy changed little until the advent of the Bolsheviks in 1917.

From the beginnings of the Communist state until the fall of Josef Stalin, the Soviet Union cared comparatively little about what went on in the Middle East. The survival of the Soviet state through a civil war, the depression and the Second World War were the main concerns of the leadership. After World War II, Josef Stalin's personality demanded a lack of interest in anything that wasn't European. Stalin's death, however, dictated a review of Middle Eastern policy in the wake of the realization that the area was now part of U.S. containment strategy, and thus, again, was the "soft underbelly" threatened.

A new Soviet policy of competition with the West over the region lasted until the cooperative policies of President Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze began to take hold. This new strategy was sorely tested in the Gulf War where Soviet ambivalence over the conflict can be directly traced to a power struggle in Moscow with Communist Party conservatives. The abortive August 1991 coup put the matter rest and firmly validated Moscow's cooperative stance. At least for now.

Russia's present concerns in the Middle East involve the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Persian Gulf and the status of the former Soviet Central Asian republics. In all instances, Russia seeks stability above all. It seeks nonviolent progress towards a stable international order where its important role is recognized. In the cases of the Persian Gulf and the Central Asian Republics, this objective forces Russia to cooperate with Iran. In Central Asia, Russia courts Iran to diffuse tensions there and to limit Iran's potential for causing trouble among restive Muslim communities. In return Russia sells Iran large quantities of arms, an arrangement that brings in much needed capital as well. In the Gulf, Russia broadly promotes a security system that includes Iran and other Gulf states. This position, coupled with a drive for cash and influence, has led Russia, again, to sell arms to Iran and also Iran's potential enemies in the Gulf. This policy will ultimately create tension between support for Iran and for other key states, likely forcing Moscow to revise its Middle Eastern strategy. It is clear, however, that current policy is based on *both* a conception of Russian political and security interests on one hand, and the need for cash and tranquility among Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Muslims on the other. Such realities could manifest themselves by forcing Russia away from cooperation with the United States, as historic Russian concerns for the southern flank begin to make their presence felt.

In the Arab-Israeli dispute, however, continuing cooperation with the United States seems much more likely. Like the areas noted above, the region of Palestine broadly sits on Russia's southern flank. Cooperation with the United States, and the possibility of a lasting peace that this

cooperation might bring, offers many benefits to Moscow. Stability in the area protects the "soft underbelly," and this means that Russia will not have to expend scant resources for intervention in the event that trouble occurs. Similarly, peace in the region means that the Kremlin will lose yet another potential reason for competition with the United States, and this will guarantee a continuation of Western aid for economically ailing Russia. A lasting and just peace will also soothe the feelings of CIS Muslims and help rebuild Russia's status as a great world power. Finally, progress between Arabs and Israelis will help secure Yeltsin's political position at home, and this will allow reform to continue.

All of this means that Russia will continue to cooperate with the United States for the near term. Such policy not only indicates a sincere desire to make Shevardnadze's "New Thinking" work, but also that Moscow's interests simply coincide with Washington's at the moment. Should change occur, it will likely not be because of Russian policy, but because of the Middle East's own intractable problems. Prudent policies to prevent this include insuring Russian participation in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations to enhance its status as a world power and silence Yeltsin's domestic critics. Also, steps must be taken to stop the flow of arms into the area as a prevention against future instability. Russia, whose arms sales provide practically the only source of hard cash for the nation, must be economically compensated. The Central Asian republics must be supported politically and economically to maximize their chances of escaping undue dependence on any one state, not only Iran, but Russia as well. Finally, Turkey must be promoted as an alternative model for development for Central Asia, as opposed to Iran.

AFTER WAR AND REVOLUTION: TRENDS IN RUSSIAN MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY

Introduction.

Cooperation. This simple word, defined as "common effort" or "the act of working together," is quite insignificant taken by itself. When applied to the current diplomatic policies of the United States and Russia, however, its importance multiplies dramatically. For example, the recent willingness of the Russians to cooperate actively with the United States has significantly defused one of the world's most dangerous political powder kegs—the turbulent Middle East. Indeed, the prospects for absolute reconciliation between the area's feuding parties have never been better, primarily due to the absence of diplomatic competition over the region between Moscow and Washington. Intransigent nations, such as Syria, can simply no longer ignore legitimate peace initiatives because of guaranteed military and political backing from the Kremlin.

And while this new cooperative stance, initiated by former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and known as "New Thinking," was implemented long before the formal breakup of the Soviet Union, there is little doubt that this collapse virtually mandates a continuation of the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze policies. The new Russian leadership apparently remains convinced that diplomatic cooperation with the West offers the best hope of peace and stability in the area. And stability is the one necessity needed by Moscow during its trying time of economic and political reform. Russia can ill afford to commit scarce resources to solve another Middle Eastern crisis. Russia can also ill afford to be dragged in on the wrong side and thus risk losing economic aid from the West. These harsh realities for Russia remove cold war obstacles and present greater prospects for continued cooperation.

Russia's current policy towards the Middle East is not without its internal critics, however. While the failed August 1991 coup attempt decided that the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze foreign policy line would triumph, the voices of the traditional opposition have not been silenced and seem to many to have gotten louder. In an ironic turn of events, Russia's relatively free press has allowed the conservative Communist opposition to voice its objections openly and quite often.

In general, these objections are portrayed as tangible results of a current Russian Middle East policy often described as deliberate "abandonment." First, the critics point out, cooperation with the West has meant the abandonment of traditionally staunch Arab allies. This could cause other Russian allies to fear "betrayal" and look elsewhere for friends. The critics also point out that this, in turn, has eliminated a lucrative source of capital for Moscow, at a time when she needs it most. After all, did not the Arabs pay in hard currencies for every nut, bolt and MiG-29 purchased? These same critics also complain that cooperation with the Americans has allowed the United States to gain undue influence in an area geographically situated on Russia's southern flank—"the soft underbelly of the Empire." Finally, the opposition complains, concurrence with Western initiatives in the area signals to the rest of the world that Russia is no longer a world power, certainly not one demanding consultation.

In this vein, Sergei Filatov, the current First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, is but one of a host of politicians who have serious doubts about Moscow's current policy of cooperation. In a recent article, Filatov spoke about the Palestinian issue and Middle East foreign policy in general. He wrote:

In previous years we continually voted "for" Palestinian interests, but now only five resolutions gained Soviet approval, and in 11 cases our diplomats abstained. What has happened all of a sudden? Senior officials of the USSR Ministry of External Relations explained to me: This was done to promote the peace conference and not to side with one of its participants, in this case the Palestinians....

The Americans acted differently. They patronized Israel in the United Nations and are continuing to do so....

I will put it bluntly: To turn away from our old friends, the Palestinians and the other Arab countries, is a shortsighted policy. Ultimately, it may have an effect on the whole Muslim world's relations with Moscow. We have already changed enough guidelines, and the results are, as the saying goes, plain to see. Is this not enough?¹

Presently there is little chance of deviation from Moscow's chosen path of cooperation, despite the conservative opposition's occasional tirades to the contrary. This makes it more likely that events in the Middle East will continue to stabilize. The reader should recognize, however, that the future is an uncertain commodity. The possibility of an international reversal still remains, causing the United States and Russia to find themselves, once again, as competitors in the same volatile arena.

Historical Background.

Competition over the Middle East is nothing new to Russia, of course, and has existed since the first czar was able to consolidate his power throughout the endless forests of Muscovy. Imperial Russian interests in the Middle East were basically geostrategic. Czarist Russia's own national policy was expansionist, ostensibly to provide a buffer against invasion, normally looking at all directions of the compass, but usually only one at a time. Moving south, however, meant collision with the Ottoman Empire that controlled the Middle East, and the expansionist faith of Islam that went with it. Thus Russia found not only a hostile neighbor that stood in the way of expansion, but one powerful enough to seriously threaten Russia herself. From an expansionist point of view, Ottoman control of the Middle East specifically blocked Russian efforts to use the Black Sea as a point of egress both commercially and militarily, as well as thwarted dreams of a "new Byzantium." From the aspect of security, the Ottomans remained theoretically powerful enough to rupture Russia's southern flank, and threaten the state itself. The vexatious slave raids of the Ottoman-controlled Crimean Tartars (the

only Mongol Khanate not destroyed by Muscovy) reminded all that the Ottomans retained as a strategic bridgehead aimed at the heart of state.² That militant Islam was totally incompatible with the Orthodox faith of Russia only made the situation the more serious.

Russia's policy against the Ottoman Empire was one of provocation and conquest, satisfying Moscow's dreams of expansion and keeping the Ottomans off balance and therefore unable to capitalize on their strategic southern position. Such a policy also established Moscow's legitimacy as a respected world power, without having to go toe to toe with the more advanced nations of Europe such as Austria-Hungary. Thus, after the peace of 1774, Russia invaded the Crimea, annexed both Crimea and Kuban (in the Caucasus) in 1783, and then extended protectorship to Georgia. Not surprisingly, the Ottomans declared war in 1787. Russia won that war, and at the Peace of Jassy (January 9, 1792) was able to legitimize her expansion by pushing out her borders until she controlled all of the northern coast of the Black Sea.³ Except for the fact that the Ottomans were increasingly regarded as a target more than a threat, Russian policy towards the Middle East changed little until the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

Soviet policy towards the Middle East would have been familiar to any czar or czarina, except for the lack of religious overtones. Admittedly, the Soviet state had more pressing problems internally until after World War II. Likewise, "Soviet policy in the region during Stalin's last years was characterized by lack of engagement. Stalin trusted nothing he could not control directly and chose to focus his attention on the conventional East-West military struggle in Central Europe and the Far East."⁴ After Stalin's death, however, Moscow's leadership became increasingly aware of Western efforts (CENTO, for example) to "encircle" the Soviet Union, and this meant that, once again, the old soft underbelly was at risk.

At this point Moscow's policy towards the Middle East became increasingly aggressive, responding "defensively" to alleged Western provocations and "offensively" to unforeseen opportunities. The process took the guise of the formation of

several alliances among the newly independent Arab states, and after the 1964 deployment of Polaris submarines to the Eastern Mediterranean during the Cuban Missile Crisis, became increasingly military in nature.⁵ Influence with the armed-to-the-teeth client Arab states in the area meant that the Soviets could not only counter any Western threats against her vulnerable southern flank, but, from an ideological standpoint, it allowed competition against the United States in an area both vital to its interests and yet close to Moscow's borders. This gave the Soviets the option of adequate power projection should the need arise. Such actions also satisfied Moscow's great power ego, since her status as a world power was reinforced.

The 1967 Arab-Israeli War, with its possibility of super-power confrontation, caused Soviet policy in the region to shift from one of pure competition to one of "collaborative competition." Accordingly, "Soviet policy could afford neither to abandon the competitive struggle in the region nor to ignore the requirement of explicitly coordinating with the United States on a sustained basis and the basis of compromise," the latter being necessary to avoid direct superpower conflict.⁶ Soviet ideological and geostrategic goals remained the same, while the idea that "there is no problem anywhere that can be solved without the Soviet Union or in opposition to her," satisfied the dimension of great power nationalism.⁷

Collaborative competition remained Soviet policy until just before the Gulf War, when Shevardnadze's "New Thinking" of firm cooperation with the West began to take hold. Born of economic necessity and a genuine desire for peace, Soviet ambivalence during the Gulf War showed that the transition was not an easy one. On one level, the Soviet Union seemed to firmly support Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. The Soviet Union supported all 12 UN resolutions on the crisis (to include Resolution 678, which authorized, after January 15, 1991, the use of "all possible means" to get Iraq out of Kuwait).⁸ The Soviets also condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the taking of Western technicians as hostages, and joined in the arms and economic embargo of the country.⁹

Yet, Moscow continually sought a diplomatic solution as opposed to a military one, with the UN playing the central role.¹⁰ The Soviets also refused to provide any of their own forces, not even a symbolic field hospital, to the anti-Iraq coalition.¹¹ They declined to bring their own technicians home from Iraq and constantly delayed any UN resolution that spoke of using force against Iraq.¹² Further, Gorbachev mounted several missions to mediate a diplomatic solution to the crisis, including a dramatic eleventh hour one on the eve of the ground war.¹³

Most analysts agree that an internal political power struggle was the greatest reason for this "wishy-washy" style of diplomacy. The Russians themselves have all but admitted as such. Andre Kozyrev, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, notes the possibility, writing:

Moscow's early vacillation may have been caused by the difficulty in overcoming the heritage of the former policy conducted in the *pre-perestroika* period and aimed at supporting and encouraging the militant and uncompromising stand of the "progressive" "anti-imperialist" regimes.¹⁴

Kozyrev was probably very close to the truth. Gorbachev's foreign policy strategy about the Third World, and the Middle East in particular, was radically different than previous Kremlin policy and was not universally supported. It was a strategy that placed a premium on *cooperation*, as opposed to traditional *confrontation*, with the West and this angered many Party hardliners. Many senior military, as well as the Party's right wing *Soyuz* (Union) bloc, openly regarded Soviet cooperation with the West as a betrayal, as well as a retreat from superpower status. Led by hard-nosed Colonel Viktor Alksnis, *Soyuz* and other conservative factions publicly supported Saddam Hussein for standing up to the West and securing the USSR's southern flank.¹⁵ The Soviet military officially backed this latter notion both during and after the conflict.¹⁶

In reality, the hard-liners challenged much more than just official policy towards the simmering Gulf War. The war allowed conservatives to challenge the whole spectrum of Soviet foreign policy "New Thinking."¹⁷ This new foreign policy

ideology had resulted in freedom for the Central European members of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany and major conventional military force reductions.¹⁸ Some conservatives also believed a successful challenge to Gorbachev on international issues, such as the Gulf War, could translate into a solid opposition on domestic issues as well.

The extent of the power of this "not so loyal" opposition may have exposed itself in early January when UN naval forces intercepted the Soviet freighter *Dmitriy Furmanov*, bound for Jordan. The ship carried military hardware which did not fit Jordanian military tables of organization and equipment, but could have easily been used by Iraq. While the incident was probably no more than a blunder by Moscow's bureaucracy, the possibility that it was the result of an independent move by the Soviet military can not be discounted.¹⁹

Gorbachev equally could not discount the fact that *Soyuz* and the others were simply too powerful to ignore. While the Soviet President had many reasons for supporting the West in the Gulf, to ignore the opinions of the traditionalists was to risk his own position of power and the reforms that went with it. Thus, while Shevardnadze proposed in September 1990 that Soviet troops might well go to the Gulf under the auspices of the UN, domestic pressures forced Gorbachev to choose a course of mediation instead.²⁰ In October 1990, Gorbachev dispatched Special Envoy Yevgeni Primakov on the first of many missions to negotiate a settlement between Iraq and the rest of the world.²¹ In a much different tone Primakov noted:

The Soviet flag has been shown, and it is being received very positively. We are a superpower and we have our own line, our own policies; we are demonstrating this point.²²

Despite such statements, Gorbachev was still able to walk his political tightrope and, at least temporarily, get away with it. He was able to support the Western coalition by simply refusing to do anything that would permanently block its efforts. At the same time his efforts at a diplomatic solution confirmed the USSR's great power status while providing the perception of traditional support to the radical Arab world. He could explain the failure of his mediation attempts by noting that the only

obstacle to a settlement was Saddam Hussein.²³ Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov, however, reminded all concerned that there was still solid opposition to Gorbachev's policies by noting:

The events in the Persian Gulf...confirm that the use of military force to solve international problems is by no means a thing of the past. The same goes for the West's efforts to obtain one-sided advantages in the military sphere, destroy parity, and establish a 'new order' in the world in its own interests by using strong-arm *diktat*.²⁴

The abortive coup of August 1991 effectively settled the feud, giving a green light for Gorbachev's policies to continue under Russian President Boris Yeltsin's administration. Soviet ambivalence in the Gulf War, however, reminds us of how close these policies came to destruction. And as voices similar to Yazov's continue to be heard, one can not say that the confrontationist policies of Czarist and Soviet Russia are a thing of the past.

Russia and the Persian Gulf.

Two of the most unpredictable actors in the region are Russia and Iran, states whose mutual relationship is volatile and dynamic and moving into uncharted waters. That relationship and its agenda are critical for them and the Middle East's new states. While the United States appears to be leading an anti-Iranian coalition whose front-line force is Turkey, Russia's ties to Teheran are considerably greater and more complex. Russia, unlike the United States, cannot afford to exclude Iran because of Iran's proximity to the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the ensuing bilateral issues that must be addressed. Russo-Iranian ties already have the potential to force Russia into unpalatable future choices between or among Iran and other local allies and even the United States. This is because Russia's relations with Gulf States will largely be shaped by the internal problems of Russia and the CIS.

Russia's paramount regional goal is the stability and security of the new Central Asian republics. It fears they could

become the center for Islamic fundamentalism that threatens the Russian diaspora in Central Asia. Therefore, a precondition of stability is continued political and defense linkages through the CIS.²⁵ Many Russian commentators now accept that the days of imperial control are over and that the new republics will largely orient themselves to Iran or other regional actors, if for no other reason than to escape reliance on Russia alone.²⁶ Thus the new republics make up part of an expanded Middle East that now includes former Soviet territories. Inasmuch as questions of Middle Eastern security now pertain equally to those hitherto Soviet territories, Russian officials discern two related, external, regional political and military threats.

The political threat is represented by Pan-Islamic and/or Pan-Turkic (the two are not the same) agitation that crystallizes into a belligerent movement within the old USSR but which enjoys support from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan (gun-running to Tajikistan), or Turkey. Such movements could attack the Russian diaspora in the Muslim republics or demand complete secession from the CIS, thereby combining internal and foreign threats to the Commonwealth's integrity.

The military threat is quite recent. It takes the form of a Muslim regime, perhaps armed with long-range ballistic missiles, conventional or nuclear, that either itself attacks the CIS or combines with political unrest and instability in Muslim republics. Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin has stated that either or both types of these threats are 'thought to be highly probable' and many Russian commentators concur with that assessment.²⁷

But the prospects for such threats and the need to avert or deter them also leads political figures to assert Russia's role in the new Middle East. Russia's primary objectives in the region are to regain standing as a major regional actor, obtain economic assistance and markets, sell arms, and safeguard Russia's and the CIS' unity against potential threats from neighboring Muslim movements or states. The pursuit of those objectives at home and abroad inevitably leads Russian policymakers to cooperate with Iran. Whatever issue one examines: Gulf security, Afghanistan, the new Transcaucasian

and Central Asian states, or arms sales, bilateral cooperation with Iran to realize the objectives of stability and security is increasingly evident.²⁸

The Middle Eastern wars of 1980-91 and Russia's desperate need for tranquility in an area it still regards as adjacent to its borders makes stability in the Gulf especially important to Moscow. New considerations of future financial gains and arms sales due to relations with oil producers add to that importance. Russia and Iran also both seek inclusion in any regional security regime. Thus Foreign Minister Kozyrev, on his recent trip, offered to guarantee the UAE's sovereignty and integrity to recover some of Russia's past standing there.²⁹ Therefore, while policy since Gorbachev aims to extricate Moscow from direct involvement in constant regional crises and reverse past hostility towards conservative Arab states, it does not mean conceding the Middle East to the United States. Moscow, even under extreme hardship, still aspires to a role on its southern borders. Kozyrev was quite frank about this during his Gulf tour. He stated,

We have renounced confrontation with the United States and the West and embarked on friendly relations with them. However, this is far from meaning—on the contrary, it presupposes that Russia will remain a great power with global and regional interests, and we have satisfied ourselves that this is what the states of the region want.³⁰

Vice President Rutskoi, while touring Israel and Egypt, stated Russia's intention to play a visible role in the Arab-Israeli peace process and expand contacts and cooperation in all fields. And Russian military spokesmen follow the same line in conversations with Israel and seek expanded mutual cooperation with it.³¹ Clearly Moscow has turned to crisis management with the United States. But it is also important to remember that Russia's long-term regional interests are unique to it and will not always coincide with those of the United States.

Thus, in the Gulf, a new policy is evolving. Russia seeks to participate in and shape a framework that balances all states' interests, including Iraq and Iran. Its goals include

limiting the quantitative and qualitative proliferation of high-tech weaponry, constructing a political conflict resolution mechanism, sponsoring arms control, and participating in the resolution of current conflicts.³² In the Gulf, as elsewhere, these are Russian policies based on Russia's sense of her interests. They cannot be construed solely as Russian efforts to follow Washington's initiatives. Moscow knows the Arab states and Iran deem a unipolar status quo made in the United States as intolerable.³³

Russian policy today relies on pursuing old-fashioned economic and strategic interests rather than on ideological rivalry and strategic competition with the United States. Its perspective is based on a traditional understanding of Russian interests. As Sergei Stankevich, an advisor to President Yeltsin, recently commented,

We should be preparing to respond purposefully and consistently to the emerging intricate knot of counterinterests and influences. It is possible, evidently, to talk about a revival of the *Eastern Question* in Russia's foreign policy in something close to the classical understanding.³⁴

Accordingly, the first priority of foreign policy is with the former Soviet republics. Then comes cooperation with the West and the third priority is relations with neighboring states like Turkey and Iran. This outlook is dictated by geopolitics, i.e. 'a normal view of natural interests'.³⁵

Russian Security Policy in the Gulf.

In this new framework, Moscow's interest in participating in the Gulf's security is not so Iran-oriented that it wants to see Iraq excluded or decisively weakened for years to come. But Iraqi obduracy has frustrated that goal. Russia supports maintaining Iraq in the Gulf equation because it wishes to improve bilateral ties with all states in the region, ensure a role for itself in regional peace processes and conflict management, preserve a regional balance of interests embracing all states, and limit missile proliferation.

Missile proliferation makes conflict management more difficult even though Russia's economic needs have driven it to sell arms to buyers on opposite sides of the fence, e.g. Iran and the UAE or Syria and possibly Israel. Foreign Minister Kozyrev now states, therefore, that stability and security depend on economic cooperation, particularly in the military sphere.³⁶ But arms sales, we are told, will supposedly not add to the regional arms race. By the same token, preserving Iraq as a factor in the Gulf and Mid-East does not represent support for Iraq's uncooperative policy towards the UN. Even though Iraq is quickly rebuilding its arms transfer programs, Moscow will not support Iraq's military buildup as in the past. Iraq's meddling in internal Soviet politics during the abortive 1991 coup and its obduracy in complying with the UN has led to a 'standstill' in its relations with Moscow. Russian ambassador to Kuwait, Ernest Zverev, noted that Moscow still suspects Saddam's policies and intentions. Thus any mutual cooperation was frozen until and unless Iraqi policy changes.³⁷

In contrast, Ambassador Zverev cited tangible progress in economics, politics and trade (subsidies and credits) in relations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates.³⁸ Foreign Minister Kozyrev also noted these new ties to the Gulf states and sought to expand cooperation by means of arms sales.³⁹ Future relations will be based on mutual benefit. It is also clear that Iran and the anti-Iraq coalition, including Israel and Turkey, offer Russia the greatest regional economic prospects.

In erecting a durable structure of Gulf security, Russian policy faces not only Iraq's obstructions, but also Arab states' suspicion of Iran, and Iran's refusal to participate in a Western-led Gulf regime that seeks to exclude Iran. At some point Russia must face the consequences of expanding arms sales to regional rivals. Accordingly, it appears that the viability of Moscow's emerging design for regional security is seriously flawed. Moscow believes that no viable regional security system can be shaped without it, Iraq, Iran, the Gulf states, and over-the-horizon Western support. Chances for such an inclusive multilateral Gulf security regime are slim. Moscow's effort to join that regime and befriend all the players will likely

fail since each of these four components will demand support to exclude its enemy as a test of friendship.

To illustrate this dilemma, Kozyrev found great suspicion of Iranian ambitions and policies, especially in Bahrain and the UAE. He tried to dispel these fears by saying that Moscow does not sell top-of-the line military equipment to Iran, but this hardly satisfied them. Bahrain and the UAE are particularly concerned about Iran; the UAE because it fears that Iran might use the dispute over several Gulf islands to invade it as Iraq did with Kuwait, and Bahrain because it has a Shia majority.⁴⁰ This mistrust among regional states places Moscow in an extremely difficult position because its agenda with Iran goes beyond Gulf security to its own borderlands' security. Yet at the same time, Russian diplomats believe the UAE can be Russia's long-term strategic ally in the region and cooperate economically and militarily via arms sales with Russia.⁴¹ Hence a serious contradiction is developing at the heart of Russian policy. Russia sees little local benefit in excluding Iran and is also determined to continue to play a great role in Iranian foreign relations. But at the same time it also seeks an alliance with Iran's likely enemies and is subject to pressure to join a U.S.-led security system. In addition, internal democratic opposition to many Iranian policies drives Moscow away from Iran.

Russian interest in bringing Iran into the Gulf is also animated by a belief that excluding Iran merely antagonizes it and perpetuates regional conflicts. Moscow also does not want to be excluded itself.⁴² But, in the Gulf, Moscow will likely have to choose between or among its friends or walk a very narrow diplomatic and military tightrope. Therefore, Russia cannot avoid a choice from equally unpalatable options that will become even more unappealing if it cannot use the Black Sea Fleet to 'show the flag' or obtain any meaningful diplomatic benefits from using its forces in regional conflicts. This point also applies if it cannot obtain status of forces accords with republics bordering on the Middle East to face future threats to CIS' interests.

Russia supports Iran's position that Gulf security cannot be maintained without all the littoral states. Moscow doubts that

bilateral treaties between Washington and littoral states and meetings of those states without Iran can stabilize the region. It agrees with Teheran that these treaties are futile efforts to exclude it from the region which Iran will not long tolerate.⁴³ Accordingly, Moscow has only a narrow room for maneuver in Gulf security issues. Its broader agenda with Iran will come under pressure from Washington and the Gulf states who prefer to isolate and exert pressure on Iran as they shape a new Gulf system. But since the Russo-Iranian agenda embraces vital security issues in Afghanistan and the new Central Asian republics, this foreign pressure is not helpful to Moscow in its quest for a regional role.

The Russo-Iranian Agenda and Afghanistan.

The Russo-Iranian agenda goes beyond Gulf security and mutual economic benefit to include postwar Afghanistan, the complex relationships between Iran and the CIS' Asian republics, and arms transfers. All these issues are interrelated. Afghanistan exemplifies that linkage. Soviet efforts after 1988 to draw Iran into the conflict resolution process improved chances to end that war and Soviet ties to Teheran. Now that the war has been terminated, both Iran and the CIS (Asian republics and Russia) continue to be involved to limit further fighting inside Afghanistan and its spillover across their borders. Russian analysts identify several potential threats that could result from a Mujaheddin victory: 1) the demand for reparations from Moscow and a 'Nuremburg' type situation; 2) demands for up to 50 percent of the water flow from the Amu Darya that could bring the economy of Central Asia to its knees; 3) expanded Islamic agitation from Afghanistan to the neighboring Central Asian republics; 4) the growing possibility that ethnic conflict among the Pushtuns and the other peoples of Afghanistan will spread. The new leaders in Kabul have already mentioned a figure of \$100 billion in compensations.⁴⁴ These threats compel Moscow to accept Iran, Pakistan, and Central Asian republics as players who must participate in conflict resolution and regional stability.

Moscow wants Iran to restrain fundamentalists in both the CIS and Afghanistan in return for accepting that Iran and its

Shiite clients must play a part in stabilizing Afghanistan and that Iran participate in the Gulf. These are not abstract concessions. Some in Tatarstan or Chechen-Ingushetia have now raised the prospect of following the Iranian model.⁴⁵ In return Moscow has had to accept Iranian economic, political, and religious influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. While in the Gulf, Russia both needs and uses Iran to enter the region and Iran needs Russian political and military support; in Central Asia and Afghanistan, Russia and to a lesser degree the Central Asian republics need Iran's support either to maintain stability or to obtain cultural-religious, economic, or energy assistance.

In Afghanistan as elsewhere, Iran's great capacity for making trouble and Russian fears for the CIS' internal security make Iran a key figure in Russian and CIS policy. Russia cannot easily or painlessly jettison Iran merely to please the United States. This extremely delicate and mutually beneficial relationship is also being tested in regard to Iran's efforts to spread its influence into the CIS.

The Central Asian Republics, Russia, Iran and Turkey.

Central Asia's republics as independent states represent an unprecedented and incalculable geopolitical development. For Iran it is an historic opportunity that may never return, one that vindicates the rightness of its course. Accordingly, Iran's leaders claim that their "duty" goes beyond formal state policies to include religious and cultural actions to influence local trends.⁴⁶ But beyond an as yet undefined point, Moscow cannot tolerate Iranian policies that threaten stability in Central Asia, CIS territory, and the multimillion Russian diaspora in those republics. It has pledged to defend the republics and their citizens even if it needs Teheran for the reasons cited above.

That said, it does not inevitably follow that the CIS' Muslims will follow Iran into clerical-led fundamentalism. The view that this outcome is inevitable has been widely disseminated.⁴⁷ But this argument misreads the reality of Islam in the CIS and fundamentally misapprehends those Muslim communities as

inherently disposed to an Iranian style anti-Western or anti-American fanaticism. Supporters of this view also assume that no fundamental cleavages exist among peoples of the Islamic republics, e.g. between Shiites and Sunnis who are seen to be 'pretty much alike.'⁴⁸

Proponents of such views implicitly assume that Central Asian Islam cannot stand by itself. If not aligned with Russia, it will inevitably follow Iran against Russia. This is close to Stalin's 1921 view that either the borderlands are Soviet or are anti-Soviet imperialist bases. In either case these areas are seen as inherently dependent on outside support and unable to govern themselves, a view that retains much of the colonialist-Stalinist view of the minorities of the former USSR.

Adherents of this view overlook or disregard the Uzbek-Tajik rivalries in Central Asia between Turkic and Iranian communities and peoples and also between Sunnis and Shiites, as well as the diversity among republics. The intense factional struggles within them belie such simplistic and inaccurate observations. Islam in the CIS is fragmented between Turkic and Iranian based groups and between Shiite and Sunnis. It also is subject to generational and urban/rural cleavages within each republic. Moreover, Iran's fundamentalist message has not played well in Sunni communities abroad and it is not likely that Sunni elites in the CIS would adopt it. Historically too, unity among the rival tribes and peoples there has been more honored in the breach than in the occurrence as a result of broad and wide socio-economic differences, including the role of Islam. Though Islam is common to all, its capacity to integrate Muslims across all socio-economic structures is vastly overstated and very suspect both within the CIS and outside of it.⁴⁹ Though regional conditions are very severe, an Iranian-led or type of fundamentalist upsurge is only one of many possible outcomes. Central Asian and neighboring states deny that the new republics seek the Iranian solution to their problems. Indeed they reject that answer. As Pakistan's Federal Minister for Economic Affairs observed, regional elites are economic technocrats, not fundamentalists. And they are not interested in fundamentalism.⁵⁰

The view that Iranian type regimes are inevitable also disparages local and Russian elites' internal capabilities and willingness and overestimates Iran's strength. Local elites showed great skill in resisting Russification that was much stronger than Iran's influence. They also are clearly very adept in handling their own clergy and reformers. It is unlikely that they would simply be swept away by those forces. In addition, Russia's ability and resolve to protect its interests solely by economic means, despite current weakness, is still great.⁵¹ Central Asian elites do not lack for help against excessive foreign influence. They used Turkey as intermediary to solicit U.S. recognition of their independence to check Iran. They have sought economic and cultural support not only from Iran, but also from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, China, the United States, and even Israel.⁵² This diversification and multilateralism must be seen as an attempt to avoid falling into dependency on any one state, Russia, Turkey, Iran, or any other 'big brother.' Though Iran has signed natural gas and trade deals with republics and dispatched religious figures and money for local institutions, Saudi Arabia has offered financial aid and grain and its own religious policy instruments: propaganda, publications, and education. Turkey is also offering massive assistance in economic infrastructure, trade, technical assistance, military training communications, and in modernizing republican alphabets along Turkic lines. Turkey views itself and is viewed by most Central Asian leaders as their preferred model, an alternative modern, secular Muslim state that has what Central Asia most needs: economic growth, Western support, and modernization.⁵³ Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the Gulf states have also reassured Russia that they oppose any political fragmentation in Russia by Muslim groups and support the CIS' stability and integrity.⁵⁴

Central Asian elites can play rival Muslim states against Iran and need not turn to Teheran. They also state that their desire for good relations with Iran is no more than that. Whether they describe relations with Iran as 'good-neighborly' or friendly, they have firmly diversified their foreign policy in the Islamic world, showing a preference for the Turkish model, and resistance to Islamic fundamentalism. For example, Azerbaijan has accepted that Iran and Turkey might play

mediating roles in the conflict with Armenia but stressed that it will remain a democratic secular state. Ex-President Mutalibov also characterized Iran's relations with Azerbaijan as a bleeding wound due to the problems existing on the Iranian side of the border. His successor, Elchibey, is also clearly hostile to Iran.⁵⁵

The international community, led by the United States, is actively countering Iranian influence. Marshal Shaposhnikov's declaration curtailing arms sales to Iran and Argentina's suspension of a major nuclear technology transfer deal reflect blunt U.S. pressure to block Iran's arms buildup that alarms the United States, Israel, the CIS, and Iran's neighbors. Turkey and Saudi Arabia also are extremely active in countering Iranian influence and any spillover of instability resulting from fundamentalism into adjoining territories. To the degree that all these states have regional influence, they will mutually restrict each other's freedom of action. Pan-Turkism or Pan-Islamism led by Iran will meet stiff opposition.

A further point is that the current war in Nagorno-Karabakh is building up pressures within Turkey to act. While those pressures need not necessarily lead to military action, clearly no Turkish regime will let Iran or Armenia, with whom Teheran enjoys friendly relations, take the lead there while it remains passive. And by the same token Iran cannot support Armenian annexation of Azerbaijani land either in Azerbaijan or Nakhichevan, which seems to be the goal of some Armenian radical nationalists.⁵⁶ So it is not likely that Armenia can find much local support from neighboring states nor that Azerbaijan can return to its oppressive 1988-91 policies in Nagorno-Karabakh. These considerations offer some basis for actually negotiating an international solution to this question and for finding common ground with both Teheran and Ankara.

Iran's overt diplomacy and foreign policy have been very circumspect. Indeed, Iranian radicals feel the government has been too reticent by far and urge a more aggressive policy in the former USSR.⁵⁷ Iran's limited economic resources and internal problems also work to restrain it from overt aggression in the near term. Yet one cannot rule out that Iran will either try to expand its influence in Central Asia to a dangerous point

or else that the region will explode and draw Iran into that vortex. Shireen Hunter argues for the latter prospect that,

Irredentist tendencies toward Iran among the Muslim republics, the existence of separatist elements within Iranian minorities, and a resurgence of Turkic nationalism and pan-Turkism are extremely alarming to Iran. In consequence, Iran's emphasis on Islamic solidarity should be seen not as an attempt to create a militant pan-Islamist front, but an effort to mitigate the surge of pan-Turkist sentiments that could be threatening to its territorial integrity.⁵⁸

Perhaps some Iranians see things this way. Foreign Minister Velayati told Indian Foreign Minister Rao that Muslims' worldwide condition is worsening, but Iran seeks a peaceful solution.⁵⁹

Whether Iran is actively aggressive or reacts out of fear of threats to its integrity, any effort it may make to use or incite violence, such as possible use of terrorism, will only trigger an equal and counterproductive reaction. A Soviet report in 1991 cited Iranian terrorism as a real threat.⁶⁰

The view of an inevitable gravitation towards the Iranian model also overlooks the fact that Central Asian republics, fearing the CIS' breakup, have begun creating their own military and police forces and are renegotiating all aspects of their defense relationship with Russia. Steps toward a mutual defense treaty, national defense doctrines, and phased withdrawal of Russian troops are all underway. Turkmenistan has led the way here. And while Kazakhstan adheres to a special security connection with Russia, whom it sees as its main partner for some time to come, it too is playing a prominent role in these developments.⁶¹

Finally the conditions in Central Asia are so inflammatory and dangerous that the World Health Organization and UNICEF recently reported that the entire area is in danger of a sudden, massive collapse of the society and economy that could plunge it into violence and chaos.⁶² Surely nobody is too eager to shoulder responsibilities of this magnitude in the current climate of economic slowdown and crisis.

Arms Transfers and Relations with Iran.

Russian and U.S. policymakers fear most that Iran, through its ongoing arms buildup, can exploit and intensify unrest in the Gulf, Central Asia, the Transcaucasian republics, or the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iran's arms buildup comprises purchases of Russian or Soviet type equipment from Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang, and offers to buy uranium and other vital materials from the impoverished republics. Thus transfers of weapons, technologies, or resources from the CIS are a key issue in the Russo-Iranian agenda and Russia's Iran policy.

Outspoken articles in the Russian media favor arms sales, in particular, to Iran. For example, Vladimir Skosyrev, writing in *Izvestiia*, states that Russian diplomats desire peace in the Gulf but cite financial need. They say that Iran is a friendly state that pursues "a fairly restrained independent policy and offers no reason to describe it as aggressive." Denying it arms sales only sends it to Russia's enemies in search of arms. Skosyrev's sources asserted that Iran no longer exports revolution, rather it pursues more traditional state interests. "Yesterday's disturber of the peace" has become "an exemplary citizen of the international community." He claims this transformation is visible in its approach to the Gulf monarchies which is 'mild'. Skosyrev concedes the terrorists and revolutionary Mullahs have influence in Iran, but concludes that arms cooperation with Iran is expedient for Russia because a pro-Iranian policy is essential to guarantee the internal and external stability of the CIS' southern frontier.⁶³ He claims that Iranian politicians and democrats have frequently shown concern that ethnic unrest in the CIS not spill over into Iran. They mainly desire stable, mutually beneficial relations with the CIS. Accordingly they will not help Muslim republics unless invited to do so. Therefore, "It follows that by helping our neighbor to create its own military potential we are not doing ourselves any harm."⁶⁴ At the same time, U.S. pressure to curb arms sales to Iran openly threatens to reduce economic aid. Washington is pressing Moscow to choose between it and Teheran when Moscow wants to choose both and sees no compelling reason to discriminate between the two. Moreover, arms sales in the Middle East continue to be a

major means of promoting Russian interests even under the new regime. Finally, following Skosyrev, arms sales are a way of paying Iran to leave the CIS' southern border alone.

Both the confirmed and unconfirmed reports about arms sales are deeply disquieting especially with regard to Iran and Syria since Iran, according to CIA Director Gates, is engaged in 'an across the board' comprehensive arms buildup and Syria has not retreated from its dream of strategic parity with Israel. Admiral Chernavin assured Syria in September 1991 that the *level of cooperation* would not be reduced and could lead to possible use of Syrian facilities by the Russian Navy.⁶⁵ The newest deal with Syria, reportedly for \$2 billion, includes MiG-29 fighters, Sukhoi-24 bombers with superior low-altitude penetration capacity, T-72 tanks, top grade armored personnel carriers, ballistic missiles (perhaps SCUD Bs), and SAM-10 ground-to-air missiles.⁶⁶ Many of these systems are top-of-the-line equipment comparable to what the Soviet army had recently received. Such shipments do not promote good relations with Jerusalem or the overall peace process.

But the arms deals with Iran are even more disquieting since they involve persistent reports of nuclear technology and/or scientists, heavy water, uranium, and equipment. What can be verified now is very alarming. Iran is in the middle of a 5-year \$1 billion-a-year program to buy Soviet weapons and has bought the following systems to date: 3 Kilo-class diesel electric submarines; 24-28 MiG-27s and 29s; Sukhoi S-24 fighter bombers and SU-27s; 200-250 T-72 tanks; 18 fighters and two modern Ilyushins fitted with aerial reconnaissance and EW equipment; and missile launchers and long-range guns.⁶⁷ Reportedly Iran will spend \$14.5 billion in 1992 to buy arms worldwide to gain the capacity to monitor and interdict or blockade the Gulf and Straits of Hormuz, construct a powerful regional air and air defense system, and develop an armored warfare capability to deter invasions or retaliatory strikes from Iraq or the United States.⁶⁸ Undoubtedly it aspires to be the regional hegemon, a status from which it could also destabilize the entire region including Central Asia. Iran's ambition and access to global weapons transfers, including high-tech sales from the United States, make Russia's reasons for continuing

sales to Iran to deflect it from the CIS borders all the more apparent.

Iran's capability has remained relatively implicit until now. But it remains a reality even if unspoken. For now, Iran's economic and military weakness prevent it from either inciting massive unrest in the republics or taking responsibility for subsequent developments there. Evidently it hesitates to alarm Moscow and other states too visibly at present. Tactical divisions within Iran's elite whether or not to actively assert Iranian influence in the republics also exist. For now, the balance seems to be in the hands of those who do not wish to antagonize Moscow by too aggressive a policy. As Foreign Minister Velayati observed after returning from the CIS, Iran will approach the republics 'through the Moscow gate.'⁶⁹ This approach is sharply at odds with that advocated by people like ex-Deputy Iranian Foreign Minister Larijani who expects Russia to fall apart in the next year and demands Iran's readiness to act in that case.⁷⁰

Certainly Iranian officials today recognize the obstacles throughout Central Asia to their ambitions, as well as the role played by Iran's rivals in restraining Iranian influence. Iran has trod warily even as it offers religious, economic, energy, and political aid to the new republics. In November 1991 talks with then Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Velayati stressed that Iran would develop relations with the republics within the general framework of Soviet-Iranian relations.⁷¹ Moscow Radio reported,

Velayati's stance on the former Soviet Union was extremely deliberate. Iranian officials did not make any statements or do anything that would help the disintegration of the Union or deteriorate Iranian-Moscow relations. Observers note that Tehran did not recognize any Muslim-inhabited Soviet republic, namely Azerbaijan.⁷²

Iran, facing unpredictable short and long-term developments, knows that it too needs Moscow as a source of arms, and as its patron for entry into the Muslim republics and the Gulf. Mutual needs and interests and conflicting pressures

thus entangle Iran and Russia despite U.S. efforts to force Russia to jettison Iran.

Russia and the Arab-Israeli Dispute.

Russian strategy towards the Arab-Israeli problem continues the conciliatory, cooperative policies of Eduard Shevardnadze and Mikhail Gorbachev. Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev confirmed this on January 28, 1992, when he stated in an interview:

Russia as a state 'carrying on from' the Soviet Union and also inheriting its active role in Middle Eastern affairs will tackle the Arab-Israeli dispute. *It has removed the ideological blinders from its eyes.* This, because we are calling for a just and strong peace in the region. That is, on the basis of taking account of legitimate concerns of all the parties directly concerned. *Such a peace responds to Russia's national interests.* That is why we will make our political line fully consistent with international law conventions which is [sic] detrimental to no one and cannot be applied selectively. (emphasis added)⁷³

Kozyrev's comments identify the official Russian position towards the Arab-Israeli question as an extension of thinking from the Shevardnadze-Gorbachev era. He further confirms that this is so because it benefits Russia's national interests. Finally, he hints at perhaps the main strategic goal behind Russian involvement in the area—*stability*. Russia needs settlement in a manner that will bring long-term peace to the area. This, in part, is because, in its presently enfeebled condition, the Russian government feels threatened by any major outbreak of hostilities in a region that it and past governments have defined as being adjacent to it and thus of fundamental strategic significance. Russia also needs to promote a perception that she remains an indispensable actor in bringing the peace process to a successful conclusion. Should this happen, Yeltsin and his country will benefit in a number of ways.

First, stability in the area will allow Russia to avoid future confrontation with the United States. The avoidance of confrontation will give Moscow further world respectability.⁷⁴

That in turn would facilitate Russia's entry into several world organizations as she proves herself a responsible international actor.⁷⁵ Russia also seems to sincerely believe that confrontation avoidance is simply in its best interests, and those of the world community as a whole. One may, again, trace this attitude back to the policies of former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who created "New Thinking."

But Shevardnadze's principle of confrontation avoidance is not the only reason that justifies Soviet efforts to promote stability between Israel and its neighbors. *A second, more practical reason is simple economics.* In the first place, to oppose the United States means to stand ready to project Russian power, military or otherwise, into the dispute to counter American objectives. This would be enormously expensive, both economically and politically. The economic outlook for Russia is bleak at best. For example, Russian oil production is so low that by next year she will become a net importer of crude, as opposed to exporting 4 million of the 12 million barrels produced each day.⁷⁶ Some analysts doubted (before Western aid arrived) that Russia had enough food for the winter of 1992. The hard truth is that domestic concerns, particularly economic reform, must take center stage. Russia cannot afford to step into another Arab-Israeli conflict.

As a related point, the ability of the United States to project *high-tech* power into the area makes the prospects of confrontation even more economically uninviting. The performance of Western precision guided munitions in the Gulf War has convinced many in the Russian military that they cannot compete with the United States except by the use of overwhelming numbers (perhaps an obsolete idea, but one which costs money) or the rapid development of their own high-tech systems (which costs more money).⁷⁷ Likewise, simply getting Russian power into the area will cost more than in the past. Russia must now contend with the fact that she will get power into the Middle East only after first gaining permission, perhaps in the form of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), from the other former Soviet Republics. There is no guarantee that the other former republics will cooperate in any case. The current dispute between Ukraine

and Russia over who owns what in the powerful Black Sea Fleet (it is based in the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol) serves as a reminder that cooperation between the members of the CIS is not a foregone conclusion.⁷⁸

But perhaps a more important point to acknowledge is that bringing about regional stability has the potential for substantial economic reward since it implies cooperation with the United States. Cooperation with the United States and its allies could well be rewarded with grants of economic aid just at the time when Russia needs it most. This was certainly a consideration during the Gulf War. In retrospect, Rand Corporation Senior Analyst Graham E. Fuller noted:

...cooperation with the West involved more than mere principle, but economic interests as well. Continued credits from the West rest on the ongoing perception that the USSR is no longer fundamentally opposed to the Western political and economic order. Hence came President Bush's offer on September 6, before the US-Soviet summit in Helsinki, to provide international aid in return for Soviet cooperation in the Gulf.⁷⁹

One should not think that Russia only looks to the West for economic reward, however. A settlement between Arab and Israeli would effectively rule out the possibility of Russia having to choose sides between opposing Muslim points of view—that is between radical states such as Syria, and more conservative states such as Jordan or Saudi Arabia. Such choices could eliminate opportunities for lucrative ties with wealthy conservative Arab regimes.

A third benefit Moscow hopes to achieve is the lasting impression that Russia, as inheritor of the Soviet Union, remains a Great Power, if not a Super Power. Izvestiya's Stanislav Kondrashov bluntly stated, on October 31, 1991, that this was the sole reason that former President Gorbachev went to Madrid to serve as the cochairman of the Middle East Peace Conference—not to foster peace between Jew and Arab.⁸⁰ His reasoning likely applies to Boris Yeltsin's government today. Should the perception remain that Moscow is one of the world's Great Powers, the implication is that Russia will have to be consulted before any substantive decisions are made

about the region. Again, the overriding theme of stability applies, because what happens with the Arab-Israeli problem could affect Russia directly. Israel and Palestine sit on Russia's southern flank and this causes concerns from a geostrategic sense for all the reasons noted previously.

Soviet efforts to foster the perception of its indispensability were remarkably compliant with American initiatives, beginning with efforts to coorganize the Madrid Peace Conference in September and October 1991. Generally the Russians allowed Secretary of State James Baker to do most of the leg work while accepting an invitation to be cosponsors. The Russians themselves recognize this, but still note that this does not degrade Russia's importance in the area. Thus Ambassador Aleksandr Bovin (a former *Izvestiya* analyst) noted this on November 3, 1991 when he spoke on Russia's participation at the conference. When asked if the then Soviet Union was playing a "deputy" role to the diplomatic efforts of the United States, he replied:

Of course, we are absorbed at present with our domestic affairs. It goes without saying that it is these issues which are taking up most of our attention, most of our concern, and most of our energy. For that reason it is true of late we have been far less active in relation to the Near East than the Americans. But this is not because we did not want to. Far from it. We have our own Near East on every corner.⁸¹

However, in the same interview, Bovin was also quick to point out:

Up to now we have played on the same side as the Arabs, and precisely for this reason we were not in a position to play a role like the Americans; everyone was aware of our partiality. Now, however, we have restored relations with Israel, and at once the objective requirements have been laid for a more active foreign policy. Now we shall be rooting for both sides, like the Americans, where before it was just for one side.

This is fundamentally important. That is what we are doing now. This shows we have a part to play in the future development of events.⁸²

Reading between the lines one sees that Bovin agreed that Moscow's preoccupation with domestic affairs has precluded an active role in the Arab-Israeli dispute. However, he also notes that this very fact gives Russia an important role to play because the absence of a countervailing Soviet/Russian balance to Washington deprives Arab states of the choice of not dealing with the Israelis at the peace table. The British Journal *Middle East* recognized this fact: "The disappearing Soviet influence undermined Arab resistance to U.S. plans and paved the way for Baker (referring to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker)." ⁸³ Syria's President Hafez al-Asad, one of Israel's prime adversaries, bluntly said, "Let us now perceive that Israel was the first beneficiary, among all the nations of the world, of the international changes that have taken place." ⁸⁴ Other regional leaders realistically noted that, "the end of the Cold War has upset basic Arab strategies." ⁸⁵

Russia's cooperation with the United States, coupled with Moscow's refusal to adamantly back one side or the other, strengthens Washington's preexisting position as the only power with influence over Israel. This means that only the United States can promote initiatives that both sides must reckon with. Thus, Russians argue, the decision to act cooperatively and passively in the peace process is in itself the mark of a Great Power, because of the power to stop the process should Yeltsin reverse course. The concept has merit.

A fourth Russian reason for seeking stability in the Arab-Israeli dispute is to head off domestic problems with Russia's own Moslem ethnic groups, as well as with the former Soviet Moslem Republics that line Russia's southern border. There is little doubt that the Soviet Union's policy of cooperation with the West during the Gulf War upset many inside that country's borders. Notwithstanding the position of *Soyuz* and other hard line elements, it seems that at least some Soviet Muslims took exception to Moscow's stance. ⁸⁶ It seems that many thought the Soviet Union was allowing other Muslims to be shot to pieces by the Western Coalition and allowing one of the few Arab powers able to face Israel militarily on equal terms to be systematically destroyed. ⁸⁷ Was the Soviet Union deliberately allowing the creation of a Middle East

where the dominant military force would be a U.S.-backed Israel?

To this end the Muslim Republics proved incredibly independent. Some Central Asian Republics practically demanded that Moscow stop the killing of Arabs on their doorstep and force a political solution to the situation, while, in Azerbaijan, the *Republic Literary Journal* ran, without opposing comment, an interview with the Iraqi Consul who presented Saddam Hussein's entire case against the imperialist United States.⁸⁸

Nor was dissent confined to just the Muslim Republics. Within Russia's own borders one found rather loud grumblings against Moscow's stated policy. In the Russian Caucasus, spiritual leader Shaykh-ul-Islam Pashazade called for a pan-Muslim conference to meet in Baku to discuss the issue.⁸⁹ In the Caucasus autonomous region, Daghestan, 5000 demonstrators took to the streets to denounce the war and to announce their intent to send both supplies and "volunteers" to assist their Muslim brothers in Iraq.⁹⁰

Obviously, the Russian Republic can not afford to ignore such feelings. Now that the Muslim Republics are independent states, Moscow's control over them is even more limited than in the past. Within Russia's own borders President Yeltsin can not afford either the money or the force that it would cost to quell domestic problems with the country's Muslim ethnic minorities. Moscow must, therefore, insure that whatever peace she helps to bring about in the area is perceived as a settlement that legitimately addresses and solves Arab concerns. She must be perceived by Muslims everywhere as an "honest broker." To this end Moscow has once again taken up the standard of Palestinian self-rule. Russia's stated position on this issue has been consistent. Oleg Derkovskiy, a Russian delegate to the recent Middle East peace talks in Moscow, explained his country's view of this issue in an interview with the Russian News Agency TASS. TASS noted:

The Russian position on the creation of a Palestinian state envisages that 'the Palestinian people have the right to self determination', but other Middle East peoples enjoy the right as

well, Derkovskiy stressed. The form of implementing the right depends on the position of Palestinians, of the Palestinian leadership and on the result of the peace process, which began in Madrid and continued in Moscow.⁹¹

Simply diffusing Muslim discontent will not be the only benefit Russia can reap if her efforts are successful in this area. Should a tolerable peace come about, then it is highly likely that Moscow may be perceived as the Arabs' friend. Moscow could easily look like the Great Power which was able to use cooperation and quiet diplomacy to insure that Arab concerns were recognized and seriously considered. The fact that the means used by Russia to obtain this goal were vastly different than in the past (in other words, nonconfrontationist) might well be of little importance to many Arabs so long as the end result was basically the same. Thus Moscow's traditional status as benefactor to Arab world could well be revived.

A careful reading of statements by Russian Peace Conference Deputy Chairman Vladimir Petrovsky confirms this basic desire to continue cooperation with the United States while retaining the Muslims' friendship. On January 29, 1992, he noted, "that Russia and the United States closely cooperated to promote progress in the peace process," while also stating that Palestinian participation in the process was "very fruitful" and that "The Middle East settlement is impossible without solving the Palestinian problem."⁹²

As important as regional stability is, Russia nevertheless hopes that resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute will achieve two further goals. These are the control of arms transfers (itself a cause of instability) in the Middle East, and the establishment of an alliance with a Middle Eastern regional power. While both areas have been discussed previously, because they directly impinge upon the Arab-Israeli dispute, the basics are worth recalling.

In the case of arms transfers, Russia is caught in an almost no-win situation. She desperately needs new capital to reform an ailing economy, and weapons are one of the few commodities that Moscow can successfully market for hard cash. However, should these same weapons turn up in the

wrong hands, and the volatile Middle East is an area where this could well happen, Russia could face the loss of aid from an angry West or be forced to spend nonexistent rubles by intervening militarily herself. This act, in turn, will force the Russians to choose sides. And this is not a pleasant proposition for a nation that needs to keep on good terms with both wealthy Arab monarchies and the West, the latter Israel's traditional friends. Russia will thus keep her weapons under a very short leash, but not so short as to deny herself the economic resources necessary for reform.

With reference to Russia's need for a strong alliance with a Middle Eastern power, this is simple recognition that nothing is forever. While Russia and the United States cooperate now in the Middle East, there may well come a day when the two powers will be at odds with one another. Russia thus needs an alliance so that she may not only counter a potentially unfriendly United States and Israel, but so that she may also have assistance in obtaining her other strategic goals in the area. As noted earlier, Iran seems the likely candidate for such an alliance, and obviously Russian participation in a just Arab-Israeli settlement could not but help move Teheran closer to Moscow in this regard. To have such an alliance even considered, however, Russia must reestablish her credentials as a great power and competent regional player. Ironically, this means getting along with the United States in the near term.

Conclusions.

Russia's immediate interests dictate accommodating the United States. But to play a role in the Middle East, Russia must respond to all of its interests: a role as an honest broker in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and as a participant in the Gulf security regime. Those seeing CIS policy as made in Washington and dictated by economic need misread much of this acute policy dilemma. Moscow must also live under the shadow of resurgent Islam at home or on its doorstep.⁹³ While a pro-Iranian order is not foreordained in the Gulf or Central Asia, the chances for stability in the new Central Asia and the Gulf without Iran are small. This is because neither region can

be guaranteed without the inclusion of mutually irreconcilable states into its security system.

Whether today's reform drive falters or succeeds, Russia's historic interest in the region will not abate. And since the CIS, especially Russia, is the most unpredictable power in world politics, it is unlikely that Moscow will simply accept U.S. dictation of its position and interests there. And since retrenchment is the order of the day here, it will become increasingly difficult for the United States to impose itself on the region and organize a durable and stable Middle East comprising mutually irreconcilable states. The end of superpower rivalry does not necessarily herald a peaceful era in this region. Rather it uncovers the regional and local dynamics of the multiple conflicts which neither the local actors nor an economically and militarily declining United States alone can resolve.⁹⁴

The Middle East remains dangerous not because of Russian policy, but because of its own intractable problems. The idea that Russia will renounce its historic interests in a vital area to obtain increasingly doubtful Western benefits is not a basis for viable long-term policies. Locally generated unrest and instability appear to be the continuing prognosis for the Gulf and Middle East. To secure its own republics and borders Russia and the CIS will have to play their own role and follow their own interests. While at times those interests may coincide with Washington's, in this dangerous neighborhood nothing is forever.

Policy Recommendations.

The immediate and longer-term dangers that conflict in the new Middle East can and will pose are not inevitable. Prudent policies can deter or avert conflicts and provide a basis for a different, not perfect system that offers more security (again not perfect security) to all concerned. Therefore, we take this opportunity to suggest some policies that the United States may usefully pursue while keeping the analysis above in mind.

Arab-Israeli Conflict. Here the United States must work with the Russians and all regional powers to stop the flow of

high-tech conventional and nuclear weaponry into the area. This injunction applies with particular force to missiles and, of course, to weapons and technologies of mass destruction: nuclear, biological, chemical. This is perhaps the most critical policy area as, left untended, it has the most potential for catastrophic results. As recent events have shown, Middle Eastern countries with advanced weapons have a tendency to want to use them, often with terrible results. Second, the presence of such arms in one country inevitably leads its neighbors to demand equal or equivalent systems. Third, the arms connection drags in foreign powers who then have transformed local issues into globally contested ones. With the option of such weapons taken away, it is easier to maintain a regional 'strategic stability'. It should be noted however, that weapons sales are about the only means that the Russians have to obtain hard currency. Thus the United States should explore ways of assisting Moscow to acquire an economic substitute if the flow of arms is to dry up.

Russian cooperation in limiting or eventually terminating these sales is needed to ensure that whatever solution is negotiated in the current discussions is maintained for a long time and not disturbed by external arms transfers. Russian concerns for stability should lead it to forego troublemaking here if adequate compensation in terms of economic recovery can be obtained.

Russia's inclusion in the Middle Eastern peace talks will also enhance her status as a world power and do much to silence critics at home. One might even encourage the use of Russian troops in a Middle East peacekeeping role to further demonstrate world power status.

Persian Gulf. The same considerations apply to arms sales in the Persian Gulf which serve only to ratchet up the tension there from an already high level. The continuing provision of sophisticated weapons to local states is a heaven-sent justification for Iran's alarming program of arms buildup. At the same time Iran's interest in dialogue and commerce with the United States can be exploited as the goal of a process involving a revived U.S.-Iranian dialogue and a drawdown, if not cessation of such externally fueled arms

ances. By lowering the level of arms in the region and drawing Iran into a dialogue, the prospects for a more durable regional security regime are enhanced.

Afghanistan. No direct U.S. security interests at stake in Afghanistan, but in the name of humanitarian concerns the United States should be acting to support UN efforts to end or mediate the current, largely tribal fighting and provide relief to those who need it.

Central Asia. The U.S. interest here dictates support for the independence of these republics and a policy calculated to maximize their opportunity for escaping undue dependence on any one of the following states: Russia, Iran, China, Turkey. We should provide as much economic aid and assistance, particularly in ecological investment, agriculture, and energy, and as much by sending manpower as by trade, investment and aid as is possible. In military affairs, as the local militaries develop we might wish to consider strengthening military exchanges with those states. However, there is no strategic rationale for forward presence. Central Asia's inferior and isolated transportation system, and its remoteness from port facilities would make sustaining U.S. forces there a logistical nightmare. A second factor is that we would be entering into an incredible political quagmire. Present arrangements should suffice to defend our vital interests.

Turkey. At present, Turkey is being steadily placed in a very difficult, probably untenable position. Muslims in Bosnia are being slaughtered and Turkey is threatening to send troops there. Additionally, Turkey was a prominent base for UN action in Iraq for the Kurds whom Turkey, nevertheless, regards as a major security threat to its own integrity. Also, it is in a very dangerous situation with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict which could draw Turkey in to protect the Azerbaijanis against Armenia. Lastly, Turkey has chosen and been promoted by Washington as a front-line state and even model for Central Asian development against Iran. All this is occurring at a time when Turkey's finances are increasingly strained and its inclusion in Europe—the EC—is problematic. If we really want Turkey to assume all or most of these burdens, we need to strengthen its capacity to play that role or diversify

some of those burdens onto other shoulders, e.g. promoting as rapid a negotiating process as possible in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, further economic assistance for Turkey, and support for its policies by Europe.

ENDNOTES

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5. *Ibid*, p. 5.

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9. Freedman, p. 6.

10. Alexi Vassiliev, "The Gulf Crisis, An Acid Test for New Soviet-American Relations," *Middle East Insight*, July/August 1991, p. 15; Margo Light, "Soviet Policy in the Third World," *International Affairs*, April 1991, p. 271.

11. Graham E. Fuller, "Moscow and the Gulf War," *Middle East Insight*, Summer 1991, pp. 61-62.

12. Freedman, p. 6.

13. Light, p. 278.

14. Andre Kozyrev, "Russia and the Middle East," *Middle East Insight*, May-June 1991, p. 3.

15. Fuller, p. 56; Light, p. 233; Alexandrova, p. 233; Freedman p. 5.

16. Defense Intelligence Agency, *Soviet Analysis of Operation Desert Storm and Operation Desert Shield*, October 28, 1991, p. 9.

17. Anatole Shub, "Soviet Ambivalence in the Gulf Crisis: A Reflection of Domestic Conflict," *Research Memorandum*, U.S. Information Agency, May 16, 1991, pp. 1-3. For example, on page 3, Shub noted Politburo Member Alexandr Yakovlev's comments, "The West must understand that now is the time when the USSR will or will not join the civilized world... I do not believe a new cold war can begin, but there is the undoubted risk of a freeze."

18. Shub, pp. 1-2; Freedman, p. 57.

19. Freedman, p. 6, see footnote 22; Fuller, p. 62.

20. Shub, p. 1; Freedman, p. 9. Shevardnadze hinted at possible Soviet military participation through the use of the United Nations Military Staff Committee, a body that existed on paper but was never used.

21. Light, p. 277; Alexandrova, p. 232. Alexandrova goes so far as to suggest that Primakov was the *de facto* leader of the pro-Iraq movement against Shevardnadze.

22. Shub, p. 2.

23. *Ibid*, p. 16. Evidently Primakov supported Gorbachev's reasoning. On p. 7 of the same paper Shub noted Primakov's 1969 description of the Iraqi leader where he found in him "a hardness which frequently develops into brutality, a will verging on willful obstinacy, a readiness to obtain his objective at any price and regardless of obstacles, and all this combined with a dangerous unpredictability."

24. *Ibid*, p. 17.

25. Jim Hoagland, "The Empire Strides Back: Russia's Army in Retreat," *The Washington Post*, June 21, 1992, p. C1; Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's Catapult to Independence," *Foreign Affairs*, LXXI, No. 3, Summer 1992, pp. 115-120.

26. *Ibid*, pp. 120-130; "'Expert' Views Islamic Trend in Central Asia," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Central Eurasia (henceforth FBIS-SOV), May 12, 1992, pp. 24-25; Rustam Shukurov, "A Fragile Compromise," *New Times*, No. 21, 1992, p. 7; Alexei Vasilyev, "Is Central Asia To Be a New Middle East?", *New Times*, No. 20, 1992, pp. 4-6.

27. Stephen Blank, *The Soviet Military Views Operation Desert Storm: A Preliminary Assessment*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1991, pp. 2-4, 23; Remarks of Dr. Vitaly

Naumkin of the Oriental Institute in Moscow, Institute for Defense Analysis, Alexandria, VA, June 2, 1992; Andrei A. Kokoshin, *The Evolving International Security System: A View From Moscow*, Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, VA, 1991, pp. 21, 28; "General Views CIS' Nuclear Weapons Control," *FBIS-SOV*, January 23, 1992, pp. 1-2; "Potential Threat by 'Islamic Extremism' Noted," *FBIS-SOV*, May 7, 1992, p. 24; Major General A. Gushev, "Voennye-Politicheskie Posledstviia Voyny v Persidskom Zalive," *Zarubezhnoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, No. 8, August 1991, pp. 3-7; Konstantin Eduardovich Sorokin, "Strategicheskoe Nasledstvo SSSR," *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia*, No. 4, April 1992, pp. 51-65. No matter how far-fetched and even alarmist such threat perceptions are (and the last two selections are just that), the perceptions are no less real and must be accounted for in any analysis.

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29. "Kozyrev Claims 'Breakthrough'," p. 25.

30. "Kozyrev on Visit," p. 23.

31. "Rutskoy's Mideast Visit Yields Business Ties," *FBIS-SOV*, May 12, 1992, p. 25; Moshe Zak, "The Answer Is Here, Not In Moscow," *Jerusalem Post, International Edition*, June 20, 1992, p. 6.

32. A.K. Koslov, A.V. Frolov, "Rol' SSSR i SShA v Uregulirovanii Regional'nykh Konfliktov (Nekotorye Itogi Krizisa v Persidskom Zalive)" *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika Ideologiya*, No. 7, July 1991, pp. 3-10; S.M. Rogov, "Voina v Persidskom Zalive: Nekotorye Predvaritel'nye Itogi i Uroki," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, No. 8, August 1991, pp. 12-21.

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34. "State Counselor Views Foreign Policy Goals," *FBIS-SOV*, April 9, 1992, p. 21. (Emphasis in original.)

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37. "Envoy on Policy Toward Iraq, Gulf States", *FBIS-SOV*, November 1, 1991, p. 9.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

39. "Kozyrev Claims 'Breakthrough'," p. 25.

40. *Ibid.*; "Kozyrev on Visit," p. 23.

41. "Kozyrev Claims 'Breakthrough'," p. 25.

42. "Kozyrev Interviewed on Russian Mideast Policy," *FBIS-SOV*, January 30, 1992, pp. 31-32; "USSR Must Seek Mideast Economic Role," *FBIS-SOV*, July 17, 1991, pp. 20-21. It should be noted that the author, Andrei Shumilin, a noted Russian expert on the Mideast, stated that he found it hard to imagine that despite the turn to new thinking and conflict resolution that Russia and the USSR would abandon their traditional role in the Mideast.

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48. Hoffman, p. A1.

49. Helene Carrere d'Encausse, *Islam & the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asia*, Quinten Hoare, Trans., Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies No. 8, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989; Shireen T. Hunter, "The Muslim Republics of the Former Soviet Union: Policy Challenges for the United States," *Washington Quarterly*, XV, No. 3, Summer 1992, pp. 63-65; James Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic's Road to Sovereignty*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991, pp. 199-200. This also is the conclusion of the authors in Cyril E. Black, Louis Dupree, Elizabeth Endicott-West, Daniel C. Matuszewski, Eden Naby, and Arthur N. Waldron, *The Modernization of Inner Asia*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1991, pp. 332-333; Jo-Ann Gross, "Approaches to the Problem of Identity Formation," and Muriel Atkin, "Religious, National, and Other Identities in Central Asia," both in Jo-Ann Gross, ed., *Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity and Change*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992, pp. 16, 62 respectively; and Robin Wright, "Report From Turkestan," *The New Yorker*, April 6, 1992, pp. 53-75; and this is true even in Tajikistan, the supposedly nearest republic to Iran culturally speaking. As the following source makes clear, clannish politics still predominate there: "Escalation of 'Clan Struggle' Examined," *FBIS-USR*, May 20, 1992, pp. 84-85.

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72. "Velayati's Objective 'To Seize the Initiative'," *FBIS-SOV*, December 6, 1991, p. 10.

73. "Kozyrev Interviewed on Russian Mideast Policy," *FBIS-SOV*, January 30, 1992, p. 32.

74. Light, p. 264; "Kozyrev on Russia's Changed Role in the World," *FBIS-SOV*, January 2, 1992, p. 79. In this article, Kozyrev continued this policy stating,

We are counting on a dependable partnership with foreign states to resolve our many tasks. I would particularly like to speak about relations with the United States. For too long the situation of confrontation with that country was created artificially. We can see no reasons today that might seriously hinder the setting up of fruitful cooperation between Russia and the United States.

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76. Fred Halliday, "The Gulf War and its Aftermath: First Reflections," *International Affairs*, April 1991, p. 234.

77. Mary C. Fitzgerald, *The Soviet Image of Future War: Through the Prism of the Persian Gulf*, Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, May 1991, Executive Summary. On page 15 Soviet Marshal Viktor Kulikov (former CINC of the Warsaw Pact) put it bluntly when he said, "...one point is already clear: the Soviet armed forces will have to take a closer look at the quality of their weapons, their equipment, and their strategy."

78. "Commander Notes Opposing Views in Fleet," *FBIS-SOV*, March 10, 1992, p. 7; "Clarifies IZVESTIYA Report," *FBIS-SOV*, March 11, 1992, p. 14. According to Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Igor Kasatanov, the Ukraine wants 80 percent of the fleet. Russia would like to give away about 20 percent. Obviously there is a need for compromise.

79. Fuller, p. 69.

80. "Gorbachev Seeks to Assert Status," *FBIS-SOV*, October 31, 1991, p. 9; Trouevtsev, Konstantine, "After the War: The Brave New World and the United States," *Middle East Insight*, May/June 1991, p. 29. Here Trouevtsev stated that Gorbachev's Gulf War peace diplomacy "was much more aimed at saving face for Moscow, domestically and overseas..."

81. "Program Reviews International Role, Events," *FBIS-SOV*, November 4, 1991, p. 14.

82. *Ibid*, p. 14.

83. Vladimir Belyakov, "Prospects for Mideast Peace Questioned," *FBIS-SOV*, October 28, 1991, p. 15.

84. Fuller, p. 65.

85. *Ibid*.

86. Vassiliev, pp. 16-17.

87. Freedman, p. 6. Freedman noted, "... both Soviet governmental officials and academics feared a very negative reaction by the increasingly restive Muslims of Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaijan if Soviet soldiers were seen killing Muslims in Iraq." This was perhaps another reason why Moscow balked at sending Red Army troops to support the UN coalition.

88. Fuller, p. 68.

89. *Ibid*.

90. *Ibid*. Vassiliev, p. 19.

91. "Petrovskiy Terms Moscow Talks 'successful,' *FBIS-SOV*, January 30, 1992, p. 31.

92. *Ibid.*

93. Graham E. Fuller, "Islamic Fundamentalism: No Long-Term Threat," *The Washington Post*, January 13, 1992, p. A17.

94. Augustus Richard Norton, "The Security Legacy of the 1980's in the Third World", Thomas G. Weiss, Meryl A. Kessler, eds., *Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991, pp. 19-34.

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